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Justifying Territorial Claims in 
Classical and Hellenistic Greece: 
The Beginnings of International Law1 
Angelos Chaniotis 
I. ' International l aw ' or just a few good m e n 
with principles? 
T h e twenty-three Magnesian judges who were elected by their city in 
112 BCE to resolve a territorial dispute between the Kretan poleis of 
Hierapytna and Itanos were not the first Greeks ever to confront such a 
task. In fact, it was not even the first t ime that their city had taken on 
the task of resolving this particular conflict; Hierapytna and I tanos had 
been fighting over a territory near the sanctuary of Zeus Diktaios from 
145 onwards, and Magnesian judges had already dealt with this issue 
in 140/139. But either because the judges of 112 were perhaps more 
conscientious than others, or because they wanted to be remembered for 
doing their job in the best possible way, they established a monument of 
their judicial work. Th i s monument contains not just a written record of 
their verdict, but also a history of the conflict and, most important, the 
principles on which they based their decision. This document, of which 
two fragmentary copies survive in Magnesia on the Maiander and in 
Itanos,2 opens with a condemnation of conflicts and praise of peace and 
concord: jus t as circumstances often bring even the closest relatives into 
conflict, it is the duty of their friends to try their best to reconcile them 
(lines 14-17). This is the reason w h y the Magnesians will ingly accepted 
the task of resolving the dispute. 
W h e n we were elected as judges, we immediately went up to the 
altar of Artemis Leukophryene and after the slaughter of a sacri-
ficial animal we took an oath upon it, in the presence of the parties 
in the dispute from the two cities and the men who had come with 
them. A n d we took our seats in the sanctuary of Artemis Leuko ­
phryene and heard the conflicting parties to the end, providing 
them (for their orations) not only the daytime, but also most part 
of the night, taking upon us every laborious toil, so that neither of 
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the adversaries might have any disadvantage wi th regard to jus-
tice (ünes 26-31). 
Af ter the representatives of Hierapytna and Itanos had presented 
their arguments, the judges made a final effort to reconcile them before 
tak ing a vote for the verdict; there is hardly any other Greek document 
which shows so clearly the preference of the Greeks for settlement 
(syllysis, dialysis) over judicial decision (dike).3 The enmity of the two 
Kre tan cities was, however, stronger than the judges' good will. T h e 
Magnes ians were left w i th no other choice than to give a verdict, which 
they just i fy in a long document of more than one hundred lines (the end 
is not preserved). In this document they narrate the story of the conflict 
in great detail, summar ise the positions of the two parties, and quote 
older documents. T h e judges also give us the reasoning behind their 
decision as wel l as a theoretical statement about the arguments that can 
be used to support a c la im of ownership (kyrieia) over land:4 
M e n have proprietary rights over land either because they have 
received the land themselves from their ancestors, or because they 
have bought it for money, or because they have won it by the spear, 
or because they have received it from someone of the mightier. 
T h i s formulat ion lists four modes of acquisition: inheritance, purchase, 
donation, and conquest - the first, second and fourth are undisputed, 
tradit ional principles of private law; only the third, the principle of 
conquest, was subject to controversy (cf. below §4.1). 
T h e subject of international arbitration has recently attracted much 
scholarly attention for two reasons: first, the ubiquity of territorial 
disputes in the ancient Greek world and, second, the numerous parallels 
the subject offers wi th the modern practice of international arbitration. 
B u t the legal and cultural significance of the reasons the Greek pre-
sented to just i fy territorial claims has generally been neglected. Recent 
studies of the subject have focussed more on collecting the evidence than 
on analys ing the principles behind the decisions rendered by the judges 
involved in arbitration.5 One of the reasons for this neglect may be the 
widespread assumption that the Greeks had not developed a conception 
of ' internat ional law'.6 I n fact, modern scholars rarely use the term when 
discussing internat ional relations in ancient Greece.7 O n the contrary, 
scholars often regard the provisions and sanctions of treaties as the 
pr imary source for the legal rules to be applied in interstate relations.8 
T h e arguments put forward to just i fy territorial claims are therefore not 
taken seriously, but regarded as mere Propaganda. For instance, Ost-
wald dismisses appeals to the 'common laws of the Greeks' as 'pious 
platitudes'.9 T h e Greeks certainly lacked a writ ten body of rules to be 
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applied in disputes between poleis, that is, a set of Statutes passed by a 
universal ly recognised legislative body and ratified by indiv idual com-
munities. They also lacked an agency that would enforce such rules. Bu t 
it is still possible to have ' international law' as a set of 'rules, doctrines, 
and policy goals which exert a regulatory effect on international rela-
tions' without written legislation as long as these norms are consistently 
and regularly invoked and applied. I n an important study of interna-
t ional l aw in Thucydides, G .E . Sheets has demonstrated that the 
unwrit ten nomoi of the Greeks were ful ly vahd as a source of law and 
just as binding as treaties.10 Sheets shows that 'they could be expressed 
in the form of specific rules and doctrines, and they could be invoked as 
the principle basis for defining issues of disagreement and resolving 
those issues in an authoritative w a y \ Sheets ended his study by pointing 
to the need to compare the data found in Thucydides wi th the evidence 
found in other l iterary sources and in inscriptions. 
The a im of this chapter is to develop the discussion begun by Sheets 
through a study of the justif ication of territorial claims in Classical and 
Hellenistic Greece. It focuses on the terminology used in documents 
concerning territorial disputes and attempts to demonstrate three ma in 
points. First, in the Classical and Hellenistic periods the Greek cities 
applied a well defined and differentiated legal vocabulary wi th regard 
to territorial claims. Second, the Greeks consistently used the same 
k inds of arguments to just i fy their claims to territory. The justif ications 
presented by the parties in these conflicts exactly correspond to the four 
principles listed by the Magnesian judges at the end of the Hellenistic 
period (i.e. to precise legal principles). Third , these principles originated 
in the early Classical (or late Archaic period) and are closely connected 
wi th the principles applied for the resolution of property disputes among 
private Citizens wi th in the city. 
II. Phras ing distinctions: the terminology of ownersh ip 
and possession in Greek ' international l aw ' 
I n a fundamenta l study, A . Kränz le in demonstrated that property law 
in the Greek poleis made a sharp distinction between ownership (Eigen-
tum or lawfu l proprietary rights) and possession (Besitz). Ac lose exami-
nation of the evidence - the epigraphic evidence in particular - reveals 
that the same distinction was consistently applied in decisions about 
disputes between poleis. It goes without saying that the relevant termi-
nology is used consistently and wi th precision only in documents where 
differences in wording had legal consequences, not in texts that contain 
casual references to the possession of land. Tha t is w h y it is necessary 
to focus here on documents about territorial claims. 
Ownersh ip is most commonly and unambiguously expressed by the 
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verb fax i a n d the n a m e of the owner in the genitive (e.g. 'A&nvauov eaxi)12 
or b y a possess ive p r o n o u n or adject ive (TIUEXEDCK; Eon, idiöq EöXI, 
oiKetoq)13 or (rarely) w i t h the n o u n nayKXiioia / Jtauraxoia.14 Other words, 
such as £%a>, Kax£x<D, and KEKXTIUOI / Kxfjoa«; ('hold, possessO, Kpax&o 
('control, holdO, veuouai ('hold, inhabitf), Kapjti^ouat ('exploit') usua l l y 
denote the possession of a terr i tory wi thout making a n y binding State-
m e n t about i ts l awfu l ownership.1 5 Le t us examine the use of the verb 
Kort6j£<D ('occupy, possess*), one of the words most commonly used in such 
a context. I n a document wh ich concerns a border d ispute between 
A m p h i s s a and Delphoi (125 BCE) it is used to express the factual 
possession of land as opposed to i ts l awfu l ownership;16 the text refers 
to plots t ha t had been given to the sanctuary of Apo l lon by the R o m a n 
senate; the proprietor was , therefore, the god (i.e. the sanctuary) . These 
plots had been, however, occupied and exploited by some ind iv idua ls (C 
l ines 9f.: Kax]£xown. Cf. C, l ine 28-D, l ine 4). T h e verb is used in exact ly 
the same sense - in Opposition to the expression Eaxi xivoq, wh ich 
indicates l awfu l ownersh ip — in the verdict of the Magnes ian judges 
ment ioned above (x<bpav ... xf|v jtpoxepov UEV owjav Apaynüiav Kai xfjv 
Ilpaioicov, KctxexouivTiv 8E xvv üitö xtov lepaTtDxvitov).17 T h e S a m i a n repre-
sentat ives before the R h o d i a n court which h a d to resolve a territorial 
d ispute between Samos and Pr iene (c. 197-190 BCE)18 used the verb 
Kocx^xeiv i n order to describe the Pr ien ian occupation of land tha t the 
S a m i a n s regarded as the ir o w n l awfu l property (l ines l l l - 1 3 f . ) . I n these 
cases, the context shows tha t th i s part icular verb al ludes to a n un lawfu l 
occupation.19 B u t the s a m e verb (as wel l as the verb l%<a) can be used in 
a neutra l sense, w i thout m a k i n g a n y Statement about the lawfu lness of 
the possession, in texts wh ich s imply establ ish a terminus a quo as the 
bas is for a verdict in a territorial d ispute (cf. below pp. 193-4). I n these 
cases the question is not who owned lawfu l l y a territory, but w h o 
controlled it at a g iven t ime. T h i s is how the verb raxExo) is used in a 
document concerning a conflict between Spar ta and Messene (c. 138 
BCE),20 w i t h regard to the quest ion w h o occupied (not necessari ly owned 
lawfu l ly ) the l and in 146 BCE ( l ines 52-5; cf. l ines 63-6 ).21 T h e verb 
KOXEXEIV is a lso used twice in a decree of Pr iene (c. 91 BCE) w i th regard 
to sa l tworks, which were at that point exploited by the city (lines 114f.: 
6«; Kax^xei Kai Kapjtl^Exai [ö 8fiuo<;]), but the ownersh ip of which w a s sti l l 
to be decided in the fu ture (l ines 116-18).22 
Because words such as EXEIV, KOXEXEIV, ve(ieo9ai etc. could not express 
clearly the legal s ta tus of a territory, one often added a h appropriate 
attr ibute to express legal ownersh ip (e.g. Kvpiax;, äoyalxbq, OIKEUIX;, 
ßeßaiaxj, eiq xöv del xpovov, ävavxipprixoi;) or un lawfu l , provisory, condi-
t ional , or v io lent occupation (e.g. ßia, raxpa xö 8ucaiov).23 For example , 
E u m e n e s I used a un ique and a lmost redundant combinat ion of attr ib-
utes in a letter to P i t ane (probably a t the request of the people of P i tane) 
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to m a k e i t absolutely clear that a piece of l and w a s theirs and under 
their complete control: 'we grant the undisputable (anamphisbeteton) 
and acknowledged (homologoumenen) un l imi ted (pagktetiken) r ight of 
ownersh ip (kyreiari) for al l t ime (eis aei chronon).'24 A few characteristic 
texts demonstrate both these differences and the careful and differenti -
ated use of a legal vocabulary. 
A n ear ly and very instruct ive passage is provided by Xenophon in h is 
Education ofKyros, in a passage in which K y r o s addresses h is victorious 
troops after the conquest of Babylon: 'None of you w h o possesses (echon) 
these th ings (i.e. the conquered l and and houses) should th ink that he 
possesses (echein) property belonging to others (allotria); for there is a n 
eternal l a w among the h u m a n s , that w h e n a city is captured the 
conquerors own (einai ton helonton) both the bodies and the property of 
those who were in the city.'25 
Besides the reference to the r ight of conquest (see below §4.1), w h a t 
is s ignif icant in th is passage is the dist inction between possession 
(echein) and lawfu l ownership (estin tinos, allotria). Kyros ' soldiers 
should not regard the possession of the conquered territory and goods 
as occupation of property belonging to others (&xsw äXXjbxpm), but as 
their l awfu l property b y the r ight of conquest (etvai xräv iAövxöv). 
Ano ther early, but unfor tunate ly fragmentary, example of a clear 
contrast d rawn between ownership and possession is found in a letter 
sent by envoys of Phi l ippoi to their city, report ing a decision taken by 
A lexander the Great concerning a land d ispute between their c i ty and 
neighbour ing Thrac ian tribes (330 BCE?).26Different phrases are used to 
designate var ious legal categories of land. T h e expression iaxi xwoc, is 
used only w i th regard to the marshes which were the lawfu l property of 
Phi l ippoi (B l ines 12f.: zä 8ä äXr\ et[vai xräv] OIAAJIJKOV) as well as w i th 
regard to l and belonging to Alexander , bu t exploited b y Phi l ippoi under 
the p a y m e n t of tr ibute (A 5: [r\ oräxoO &rt]iv x&fxx). B y contrast, the Status 
of land granted by Ph i l ip to the Thrac ians and to Phi l ippoi w a s more 
ambiguous , and the author therefore avoids the clear and unequivocal 
vocabulary of ownership and uses the verbs KapTtv^eoGai ('exploit'; B 4-6), 
ßxeiv ('possess'; B 6), and vtueaOat ('hold, exploit'; B 9f.), instead of, e.g., 
eivca 0paK©v or eivai <&IXüIJKOV. W e notice tha t in two cases these verbs 
are fol lowed by a reference to the exact condit ions of possession ('just as 
A lexander decided about them' and 'just as Ph i l ip gaveO; a s imi lar 
reference m a y have stood in the th ird case as wel l (e.g. 'according to the 
same terms'). Most te l l ing is the clause in B 9f.: the Citizens of Phi l ippoi 
h a d the r ight to hold and exploit a territory (nemesthai), under the 
condit ions under wh ich Phi l ip , the land's l awfu l proprietor, had g iven it 
to Phi l ippoi (kathaper edoke Philippos). T h e verb edoke is not used, here, 
to express transfer of ownership, but only the condit ional transfer of 
property (cf. below p. 204). T h e conditions probably included the pay-
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ment of tr ibute as in the case of another territory belonging to the 
Macedon iank ing (cf. A4 -6 :pros te lous [ iphoron ...]).27 
A conflict between Nagidos and Arsinoe provides another charac-
teristic example of the careful distinction between possession and 
ownership.28 T h e Nagideis give their version of the controversy in a 
decree (lines 19-30): 
W h e n Aetos, son of Apollonios, a Citizen of Aspendos and of our own 
city, became a general in K i l ik ia , he occupied a suitable site and 
founded a city by the name of Arsinoe, named after the king's 
mother. H e settled new settlers in the place and he divided the 
land, which was ours (hemetera[ri\)), expell ing the barbarians w h o 
had been inhabit ing it (tous epinemomenous). A n d now his son 
Thraseas, who has been sent by the k ing as a general in Ki l ik ia , 
shows great zeal in his efforts to make the city more glorious, and 
he has asked us to give up the public land (ten choran ten de-
mosian, sc. our public land) to the inhabitants, so that they m a y 
possess it (ech[ein]) for all t ime, they and their descendants. 
A l though this text does not refer directly to a dispute, we know for sure 
that the decree of Nagidos was preceded by a long-lasting conflict 
between this city and the new foundation. Th i s conflict is explicitly 
mentioned in a letter of Thraseas to Ars inoe (lines 4-6): 'Since now the 
Nagideis have followed our request and have marked out (the land) so 
that it m a y be yours (hymeteran einai) without any remaining contro-
versy ...;' similarly, the decree of Nagidos forbids any further dispute on 
this matter (lines 40-5). Thus , the story can be plausibly reconstructed 
as follows: the Nagideis h a d lost control over the disputed land because 
of the raids of barbarians; they h a d not lost, however, its lawful owner-
ship. They regarded this land as their property, even after Aetos had 
expelled the barbar ians and had founded Arsinoe there (cf. below 
p. 199). For this reason they insisted upon the fact that they, the lawful 
owners - not Aetos or Thraseas - gave their l and to Arsinoe. It was only 
after this rather theatrical, but legally necessary act that the land 
became the property of the Arsinoeis. 
W e see that the terminology of the documents that concern territorial 
confl icts in Classical a n d Hel lenist ic Greece reveals a n awareness of 
impor tan t legal d ist inct ions and the difference between possession 
a n d ownersh ip as wel l as between condit ional possession and v io lent 
a n d un l awfu l occupation. W i t h these dist inct ions in mind , we can 
better unders tand the legal a rguments advanced in m a n y terr i tor ial 
disputes. 
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3. A few things judges w a n t to know, 
a few things adversar ies w a n t to teil 
A s we have seen, the Magnesian judges of 112 BCE recognised the 
existence of four ways of acquiring ownership: conquest, inheritance, 
purchase, and gift (see p. 186). Common sense teils us that these means 
of acquiring property are mutua l ly exclusive. A n argument such as 'I 
own this ring because I inherited it, and by the way I also bought it from 
m y cousin' strikes us as very odd. I f we expect from the Greek commu-
nities to have very clear, unambiguous v iews about the origin of their 
claim on a territory, we wil l be easily deceived in our expectations. A s a 
result of wars, civil conflicts, foreign raids, or royal interventions, 
territories changed hands very often in the course of the turbulent 
history of the Greek world. These factors, combined wi th the various 
methods of proving ownership, gave rise to the complex disputes that 
confronted Greek arbitrators and judges, and, from the second Century 
BCE onwards, the R o m a n Senate. To award ownership to one of the 
parties in a dispute, the judges had in theory to determine the historical 
moment that could be considered the foundation of a legitimate claim: 
is the decisive moment the init ial possession of the territory, the last 
lawful transaction, or the moment of a major diplomatic event? These 
three ways of defining the question are mutua l ly exclusive. 'One party 
is the lawful owner of the land because this party conquered it during 
the return of the Herakleidai, but also because they bought it forty years 
ago' also seems stränge to us. Yet, in reality things are never as s imple 
as that despite the very clear Instructions given by the Roman Senate 
to Greek judges in international conflicts. A s we are going to see, the use 
of mult ip le arguments is a very common phenomenon in Greek interna-
t ional arbitration. 
A territorial dispute is the confrontation of two wishes: the wish of the 
adversary that holds a territory to retain possession and to have his 
ownership recognised and the wish of another party to take possession 
and gain ownership. T h e current occupant must explain how he came to 
possess the territory in a lawful manner; the adversary has to present 
his request as the terminat ion of an un lawfu l State and as a return to 
an earlier, lawful Situation. Th ings usual ly do not end here. I f the 
plaintif f can provide some early evidence, then the defendant wil l try to 
prove either that the plaintiff 's allegations are unfounded or that his 
ownership and possession dates to an even earlier period. Territorial 
Claims thus inevitably turn to questions of origins and chronology. T h e 
conflict between A thens and Phi l ip I I over Amphipol i s provides an 
interesting example.29 T h e corpus of the Demosthenic orations contains 
a letter, allegedly written by Phi l ip, which presents the position of the 
Makedonian king; the letter is probably not authentic, but it still reflects 
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the ideas of the t ime (and possibly the Makedonian arguments). Phi l ip 
explains in this letter that three principles just i fy his claim: inheritance, 
conquest, and concession on the basis of a treaty: 
For if (Amphipol is) belongs to those who have taken control of it 
originally, then w h o can say that I do not possess it justly, since 
Alexander, m y ancestor, occupied that place first? ... B u t even if 
someone should dispute this and demands that it should belong to 
those w h o became its sovereign owners later, then I have this right 
as well. For I defeated after siege those who had expelled you and 
had been settled there by the Lakedaimonians , and captured the 
fort. Indeed, all of u s inhabit our cities either because our ancestors 
have handed them over to us or because we have become their 
sovereign owners in war .... W h a t other possession can be more 
secure than the possession (of Amphipol is ) , which was originally 
(ex arches) occupied by our ancestors, and became again ours in 
war, and thirdly w a s conceded (to us) by you, who have the habit 
of disputing even the cities which have nothing to do wi th you?30 
Al though the letter is probably not authentic, Philip's arguments f ind 
close parallels in the argument used by the Athen ians in the same 
dispute as wel l as in arguments k n o w n from later documentary sources. 
T h e letter contains three different k inds of justification: original occu-
pation, conquest in war, and recognition by treaty. A recently published 
Hellenistic inscription has a s imi lar combination of justif ications: K i n g 
Eumenes I I explains in a letter to Tyr ia ion that he was given Seleukid 
territory in As ia Minor after the peace of Apame ia by its legit imate 
owners, the Romans, 'who have acquired control by war and by treaties'.31 
In 'Philip's Letter' the grounds for the king's case are divided into 'original' 
(ex arches I protou) and la ter ' (hysteron) Claims. Aeschines (2.31-3) also 
separates earlier and later claims when he argues that Amphipolis belongs 
to the Athenians: Aeschines begins with the original occupation of the site 
(2.31: tes ex arches kteseos), then reminds the king that the Athenian rights 
were recognised by a peace treaty (2.32),32 and finally attempts to invali-
date Philip's right of conquest (2.33; see below p. 198). 
Aeschines' mention of the original Status of Amphipo l i s is not a 
rhetorical device, but the sort of argument one expected an ambassador 
to make in such a Situation. Arguments based on the init ia l occupation 
of territory in similar contexts in the epigraphic evidence show that we 
are dealing wi th a central issue in legal disputes over territories. T h e 
best documented case is the dispute between the Samians and the 
Pr ienians over Batinet is (cf. n. 18), which is described in a letter sent by 
K i n g Lysimachos to the Samians: 'The Pr ienians tried to demonstrate 
the init ial (ex arches) possession of Bat inet is wi th the help of historical 
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works and other testimonies and documents' and 'they asked us to give 
them back the land on the basis of its init ial possession'.33 A l though the 
disputed territory had changed hands several t imes, the Pr ienians 
based their claim on the init ial ownership of the land, us ing exactly the 
same expression as Aeschines. T h e Samians responded wi th a s imi lar 
argument and pointed to the fact that they had inherited the territory 
from their forefathers.34 Several other inscriptions refer to requests to 
re-establish the 'original' (ex arches) Status of the territory.35 
The problems inherent in this principle become clear in the contro-
versy over Amphipo l i s : when Phi l ip I I c laimed that the area had 
belonged to the Makedonians in a n early period (under k ing Alexander 
I), the Athen ians replied by recounting their own legend: Theseus' son 
A k a m a s had received this land as a dowry. Th i s argument in turn 
prompted the Makedonians to refer to still another legend: Amphipol i s 
belonged originally to the Herakleidai.36 Some parties might go so far as 
to invent a historical narrative: the Rhodian judges who decided the 
conflict between Samos and Priene discovered that the history of Maian -
drios cited by the Samians was not one of the author's authentic works. 
The R o m a n s were not particularly eager to be confronted wi th this 
type of argument,37 and established an entirely different principle: what 
judges should try to determine was not the original status of the 
territory, but who occupied it at a given moment of time.38 Th is principle 
is not u n k n o w n in the earlier history of Greek interstate relations: as 
early as 380, Isocrates recommended this principle as one of the ways to 
establish peace.39 The earliest known dispute where this principle was 
applied is the conflict between Magnesia on the Maiander and Priene (c. 
175-160 BCE). The Senate declared that the land should belong to 
whoever held it at the moment when Magnesia and Priene became allies 
of the Romans.40 Mel i taia and Narthakion also appealed to the same 
principle in another territorial dispute (c. 140).41 The representatives of 
Mel i ta ia claimed that the disputed public land and an abandoned 
fortress were their property when they concluded their treaty wi th 
Rome (lines 19-22); they also requested the Romans to confirm the 
val idity of three earlier (favourable) verdicts. Bu t the representatives of 
Narthakion claimed also that the disputed land belonged to them when 
they became amici (friends) of the Romans ; they were also able to 
present a verdict that favoured them. T h e arguments are mutua l ly 
exclusive, but there may be a plausible explanation: Melitaia and 
Narthak ion must have become amici at different dates (Melitaia first, 
Narthakion later). T h e land mus t have changed hands exactly during 
the period in question, i.e. dur ing the Second Makedonian War.42 T h e 
Solution adopted by the Romans was to determine an earlier historical 
moment of decisive importance - the establ ishment of the Thessal ian 
League by F lamin inus - and to confirm the verdict given at that t ime 
193 
The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece 
(lines 63-5). Var iants of the same principle were applied in other con-
flicts, in which the decisive terminus a quo was the first involvement of 
the R o m a n s wi th the issue in question.43 T h e Senate occasionally devi-
ated from this rule, as in the case of the conflict between Priene and 
Samos (135 BCE) when the Senate decided not to confirm a decision by 
Man l ius Vulso in 188, but an earlier verdict given by Rhodian judges.44 
No matter how the issue that the judges had to resolve was formu-
lated, the contestants would not only present evidence relevant to this 
issue, but they would at tempt to influence the judges wi th an impressive 
var iety of arguments. These arguments are often summarised by the 
judges in their verdicts, and there are a few examples of test imony given 
by witnesses.45 One of the questions that seem to have been relevant for 
the verdict was whether or not the lawful owner exercised the rights of 
ownership.46 Two of the foreign witnesses presented by Konda ia testi-
f ied that the city was in fact exploiting the disputed land by extracting 
a transit toll (line 17f.: paragogion), cult ivating it (line 27-8.: georgoun-
tas ... kai nemomenous), and hav ing a keletra (line 35f; the meaning of 
the word keletra is not clear). Other advocates presented evidence for 
transactions that had taken place, in or wi th regard to, the disputed 
territory without giving rise to protests from their adversary; this could 
be taken as a tacit recognition of territorial claims.47 T h e duration of the 
occupation and exploitation of the disputed territory is very often legally 
irrelevant, but it was stil l a point that the parties l iked to make to the 
judges. Th i s is why we often f ind references to the ancestral rights or to 
the possession of land for m a n y generations.48 W h e n Lysimachos almost 
apologises to the Samians for l istening to the arguments of their adver-
saries from Priene (cf. pp. 192-3), it is because he was not aware that 
the Samians had held the disputed territory for so long: 'if we had known 
that you h a d had this land in possession (echein) and use (nemeiri) for 
so m a n y years, we should never have undertaken to hear the case.'49 
O f course, the most important argument in a territorial conflict would 
a lways be the proof that the territory in question had been acquired by 
a Community in one of the four ways specified by the Magnes ian judges 
(see p. 186) and had henceforth remained in i ts possession. It is these 
four legit imate means of acquisition of territory that we wil l now 
examine, focusing in particular on some factors that could l imit the 
application of these principles. 
4. Acquis i t ion o f terr i tory in international l aw 
4.1. Conquest 
W h e n the Magnesian judges explained that one of the means by which 
communit ies acquire land is victory in war (dorati kratesantes), th is 
194 
9. Justifying Territorial Claims in Classical and Hellenistic Greece 
would not have come as a surprise to the Kretans who heard their 
verdict. T h e Hellenistic period had seen more wars of conquest on Krete 
than any earlier period in the history of the island.50 Nor would most of 
the Greeks, perhaps wi th the exception of some philosophers, have been 
shocked by such a statement. T h e nat ional legends of every Greek 
Community - at least those who did not claim to be autochthonous -
contained a successful act of violence that had established its ownership 
of its territory. 
Bu t there is no need to look to the myths for the right of war. 
According to Aristotle the art of war is one of the skil ls by which men 
acquire the ownership of goods.61 Th is practice was recognised as cus-
tomary law (nomos). A n important passage in Thucydides is quite 
revealing. Af ter their defeat at Delion (424 BCE) the Athen ian troops 
occupied the sanctuary of Apol lon, which was in Boiotian territory. 
W h e n the Thebans sent a herald to protest against their action, the 
Athen ians responded as follows: 'The Greeks have a law (nomos) that 
whoever has under his power (kratos) a piece of land, whether big or 
small , also owns (gignesthai tinos) the sanctuaries, managing them in 
the same manner as before to the best of his ability. For the Boiotians, 
as well as most other men, have used violence to expel another group of 
people and now hold (nemontai) their land, hav ing as their own (oikeia 
kektesthai) those sanctuaries, which belonged to others (allotriois) when 
they first came upon them.'52 The argument presented by the Athen ians 
(as presented by Thucydides) deserves comment. The Athen ians observe 
that most of the other Greeks have seized land that used to belong to 
others, implicit ly drawing attention to their own autochthony. Af ter the 
violent expulsion of the previous owners (bia nemontai), the conquerors 
acquired the land (and its sanctuaries) as their own (oikeia kektesthai). 
T h e foreign object of conquest had become their property, on which they 
exercised control (cf. kratos). Th i s principle was in accord wi th the 
customary law of the Greeks. 
T h e acquisition of ownership through the right of conquest is also 
found as a principle of international law in Xenophon's Education of 
Kyros (see note 25): 'there is an eternal law (nomos) among the humans , 
that when a city is captured the conquerors own (einai ton helonton) 
both the persons and the property (chremata) of those who were in the 
city.' L ike Thucydides, Xenophon presents the right of conquest as a law; 
since the context is a Pers ian one, he does not speak of a Greek law, but 
of a law that applies to all h u m a n beings. In this respect, the passage 
reminds us of the formulat ion used by the Magnesian judges ([an]thro-
poi tas kata ton topon echousi kyrieias). T h e more general formulation 
was necessary in this case because the verdict was requested not just by 
two Greek communities, but by the Roman Senate. W e f ind the same 
idea in the letter attributed to Phi l ip concerning his c laims on Amphipo -
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Iis (cf. p. 192): 'all of u s inhabit our cities either because our ancestors 
have handed them over to us or because we have acquired control of 
them (kyrioi) in war.' 
There is more evidence for the right established by conquest and war 
in the Hellenistic period, but it does not alter the picture described in 
the earlier sources.53One of the most interesting cases is the arbitration 
of Pergamon in a dispute between Myti lene and Pitane.54 T h e P i tan ians 
had bought the disputed land from Antiochos I, the successor of Seleukos 
I, who in his t u m had acquired it after the victory over Lysimachos (line 
132: [...machei epi\kratesantos). T h e m a n y documents quoted in the 
verdict of the Pergamene arbitrators (lines 133-44) leave no doubt that 
the question they had asked was whether this transaction was lawful or 
not (cf. ünes 149f.), i.e. whether P i tane h a d bought the land from its 
lawful owner (cf. below p. 203). A l though this is not stated explicitly in 
the fragmentary inscription, it seems certain that the question was 
whether Seleukos' victory at Kouropedion made h im and his successor 
lawful owners of the land and therefore gave them the right to seil it.5B 
Th i s right was recognised by the Pergamene judges because it had been 
confirmed by Phi letairos and Eumenes I. 
T h e same question arose in the negotiations between Eumenes I I and 
Tyriaion sometime after 186.56 T h e inhabitants of Tyr ia ion seem to have 
received the Status of a polis under the Seleukids, a grant that Eumenes 
regarded as inval id because the Seleukids were not the lawful owners 
of the territory (lines 22-3: hypo ton me kyrieuonton). I n a dramatic 
gesture, he made Tyria ion a polis, but also stressed that he was the one 
who had the right to m a k e the grant since he was the lawful owner of 
the territory (ünes 20-1: ektemenou kyr[i]os). T h e claim was founded on 
the fact that he had received it f rom the Romans , who had won (epi-
kratesanton) it both in war (polemoi) and through treaties (synthekais) 
(lines 21-2).56 
T h e principle that the violent conquest of foreign land establishes a 
legit imate ownership is therefore neither a l iterary fiction nor an arbi-
trary claim made by the Magnes ian judges. O n e m a y f ind an analogous 
idea in private law, which also recognised violent forms of acquisition of 
property (war booty, booty of pillage).57 T h e origins of th is idea cannot 
be determined wi th certainty, but it is certainly older than the Sophistic 
idea that might makes right. T h e reason w h y the principle occurs in 
both private and international law is possibly not mutua l influence, but 
common origins, which are probably connected wi th idea that success in 
a violent activity (war, piracy, raid) cannot be achieved without the 
support of the gods and may be viewed as the pun ishment of the 
defeated party. The most instructive example of a defeat in war seen as 
pun i shment for un jus t behaviour is that of A thens ' defeat in the 
Peloponnesian War. A s Xenophon explains (Hell. 2.2.10), the Athen ians 
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believed they suffered not for the punishment (timoroumenoi) they 
inflicted on others, but for the injustices they committed through their 
own arrogance (dia hybrin edikoun). 
Divine support for acts of piracy is implicit ly recognised in the custom 
of dedicating a tithe of the booty to the gods - a thanksgiv ing dedication 
corresponding to the idea of do ut des.58 T h e earliest piece of evidence for 
this idea is the archaic inscription of A iakes of Samos (c. 500) who 
dedicated to Hera part of the booty won during sea raids.59 A n interest-
ing appeal to this principle is found in the arguments made by the 
Samians in a conflict wi th Priene over the fort Kar ion and the region 
called Dryoussa.60 Their claim on these areas was based on the right of 
conquest, after the destruction of the Kar i an city of Melie and the 
division of its land, and it was confirmed through the 'verdict of their 
victory inikas krisin)' in a battle against the Pr ienians (lines 105-6).61 
This principle does not seem, however, to have been unanimous ly 
accepted without qualification. A careful reading of two passages of 
Isocrates (who makes the same distinction between possession and 
ownership we have already encountered) shows that the orator did not 
th ink tha t conquest a lways establishes a legit imate claim. I n his 
Panathenaic Oration he implies that the conquest of the Peloponnese by 
the Dor ians was ülegitimate: 'They divided the cities and the territories 
which they took from their lawful owners (tous dikaios kektemenous).'82 
In his oration On the Peace (17) he refers to powers that possess 
(katechontori) the cities of others by violence (biai); th is phrase gives one 
the impression that the defeated party remains the legit imate owner. 
Yet in other places Isocrates regards violent conquest as a legit imate 
means of acquiring ownership.63 One might explain these apparent 
contradictions in Isocrates' v iews as result ing from the different con-
texts in which he expresses them or to his moral is ing tendencies. One 
can trace the same moral is ing ideas in Aristotle's treatment of slavery, 
and particularly enslavement in war. Aristot le (Pol. 1255a l l -25) reports 
the variety of opinions about the subject, then says that some thinkers 
regard slavery as a result of war as just. T h e n follows an objection to 
this view: a war may be unjust.64 
But there is probably more in Isocrates' v iews than just philosophical 
preferences. The different att itudes were noticed by E. B ickermann and 
J . Sykoutris, who have emphasised the importance of the motivation for 
the violence that leads to pössession. Conquest in general does not 
create the right of ownership, but only violence undertaken as a result 
of provocation or as vengeance for injustice.65 A l though the Magnesian 
judges, Thucydides or Xenophon did not make such a distinction, the 
legitimacy of the act of violence appears to have played a key role. T h e 
very fact that the Greeks, both in legend and in historical documents, 
tried to present just causes is clearly related to this principle.66 One can 
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find further evidence for the principle in Demosthenes' Against Ktesi-
phon, where the orator denounces Philip's aggression: 'he takes away 
cities that do not belong to h im; he has even wem by the spear some of 
the cities of the Athenians , without having first suffered injustice at the 
hands of the A then ian people.'67 T h e orator is not criticising conquest in 
general, but unjusti f ied, unprovoked conquest. T h e importance of this 
distinetion can be seen in a document of an entirely different nature, a 
curse tablet deposited in a grave in Oropos. A n anonymous man curses 
a series of persons and places all h is hopes in the gods of the underworld 
w h o wil l respond to h is request and punish h is opponents precisely 
because he had been wronged without having wronged them first.68 Th i s 
idea pers is ted un t i l the la te Hel lenis t ic period. W h e n envoys of 
Hierapytna appeared before the R o m a n Senate to defend their c laims 
over a disputed territory, they made sure to mention the fact that they 
had not attacked or wronged their adversary, Itanos.69 
T h e specific circumstances of the conquest might also affect the 
legitimaey of ownership through victory in war. The case of Amphipo l i s 
is revealing. Aeschines claimed that a treaty that A m y n t a s had sworn 
awarded the city to the Athenians ; however, the resistance of the 
Amphipo l i tans prevented the Athen ians from taking control of the city. 
In 360 Perdikkas, Phil ip's brother, conquered Amphipol is , but after his 
death (359) Phi l ip rel inquished control over the city to avoid challenging 
A then ian claims. But the city managed to retain its autonomy unt i l 
Ph i l ip reconquered it i n 357. We have already examined Philip's claims 
to the city. Aeschines replied to Philip's c laims wi th an argument that 
was more than just a technicality: 
I f you argue that you reasonably possess Amphipo l i s by hav ing 
taken it in war, i f you had won the city with spear f ighting against 
us, then you would be the sovereign owner (kyrios echeis), hav ing 
acquired it aecording to the law of war. B u t if you have taken the 
city belonging to A then ians from the Amphipol i tans , then you do 
not possess their property, but the territory of the Athenians.7 0 
Aeschines did not challenge Philip's right of conquest, which he admits 
was consistent w i th 'the law of war'; he does not even ask whether Phi l ip 
had fought a just war against Amphipo l i s or not. W h a t undermined 
Phil ip's claim on the city was the fact that Phi l ip had taken Amphipo l i s 
not from its lawful owners (the Athenians) , but from the Amphipol i tans . 
T h a t this was not a technicality or a rhetorical device of Aeschines can 
be inferred from a s imi lar Situation with regard to Phil ip's claims on 
Halonnesos,71 which had previously belonged to the Athenians . W h e n 
Phi l ip took the is land defeating the pirates who had occupied it, this did 
not affect the A then ian claim on the island. For this reason Demos-
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thenes insisted that Phi l ip should not 'give', but 'return' the is land to the 
Athen ians (7.5; 12.14; cf. Aeschin. 3.83). Giv ing is the right of the lawful 
owner, and Phi l ip was not the rightful owner. This p lay on words, which 
the comic poets ridiculed,72 had important legal implications. Isocrates 
uses the same type of argument to legitimise the Dor ian occupation of 
Messene. Messene was deposited for safekeeping (parakatatheke) in the 
hands of Nestor but did not belong to h im; the legit imate owners were 
the Herakleidai.73 
The documentary sources contain more examples of this k ind of 
argument. We have already seen (p. 190) that Nagidos regarded a 
territory as its lawful property although it had been occupied by barbari-
ans. W h e n a Ptolemaic general expelled these barbarians, occupied the 
land, and founded a new city there, the Nagideis still regarded this land 
as their own public land (lines 22-3, 26). From their point of view, they 
had never lost ownership, despite these changes, presumably because 
they had not lost this land after a defeat in a just war. The dispute 
between Samos and Priene over a strip of land north of Myka le called 
Batinet is is very s imilar (see n. 18). W h e n k ing Lysimachos was asked 
to arbitrate in 283/2, the disputed territory was in the possession of the 
Samians, but the Prienians claimed that it had orginally belonged to 
them. They temporari ly lost it in the seventh Century BCE, during the 
K i m m e r i a n invasion under Lygdamis, but after a period of three years 
the land was 'returned' to them. I t is crucial to observe here the empha-
sis the Pr ienians place on the word 'return' (apodidonai).1* According to 
the Prienians, there were no Samian Citizens there at that point, except 
for a few Samian lessees of Pr ienian land; the Samians brought the land 
under their control later. The Samians had a different story to teil, but 
they relied on the same principle: the violent, temporary occupation by 
the K immer ians had not terminated their ownership. They admitted 
that they had left th i s land after the K i m m e r i a n invas ion, but the 
in terrupt ion of their control over the l and did not inva l idate their 
c la im. Unfor tunate ly the stone breaks off at th is point so we do not 
k n o w the rest of the ir arguments . In the miss ing port ion of the 
inscr ipt ion the Samians m a y have c la imed either tha t they returned 
to the l and after the K i m m e r i a n s had left or that they remained its 
l awfu l owners despite the grant of th is terr i tory by Lygdamis to the 
Pr ien ians alone.75 
Not every mil i tary victory established legal claims. T h e reasons for 
the war (unprovoked, unjust) and the actual circumstances of the con-
quest m i g h t l im i t the appl icat ion of th i s pr inciple. Some vague 
references to an un just or unlawful occupation may in fact be connected 
wi th such arguments.76 
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3.2. Inheritance 
T h e acquisitum of l and by inheritance is a n argument that we have 
already seen listed next to conquest in the verdict of the Magnesian 
judges. Inheritance is also found in the letter allegedly writ ten by Ph i l ip 
w i th regard to his c laims on Amphipohs : 'All of us inhabit our cities 
either because our ancestors have handed them over to us or because 
we have become their sovereign owners in war ' (cf. p. 192). Unl ike the 
right of conquest, inheritance is a well known part of property law and 
seems to require no comment.77 B u t the right of inheritance in interna-
t ional disputes has some important ideological implications, in particu-
lar in regard to the means by which the various parties prove they have 
acquired property by inheritance, i.e. the use of history as a n argument. 
Ancestral rights p lay a key role in the earliest attested references to 
territorial conflicts. T h e cult of the ancestors is directly connected wi th 
this phenomenon, since the presence of their graves in a disputed 
territory w a s often used to prove long-standing claims to land. O n e of 
the earliest traditions about interstate arbitration, a decision of k ing 
Pausan ias in a conflict between A thens and Delos, reveals how much 
weight this argument might carry. Pausan ias is reported to have as-
signed the is land to the A then ians because the Del ians were unable to 
point to any graves on the is land where their ancestors were buried.78 
O f course, this story m a y be just a joke: how could the Del ians possibly 
identi fy the graves of their ancestors, since all graves had to be removed 
from the is land twice, in the s ixth and again in the fifth Century BCE? 
Yet, we f ind a s imilar tradit ion in connection wi th the A then ian claims 
to Salamis. Solon is said to have demonstrated that the burials on 
Sa lamis corresponded to the A then ian and not the Megar ian customs -
the first case of a State exploiting 'archaeological' f inds for political 
purposes.79 
There was a major difference between private property law and the 
practice in international arbitration. In private property law only direct 
inheritance establishes proprietary rights, whereas in Greek diplomatic 
history the appeal to ancestral rights appears only when one of the 
parties could not establish a continuous and unbroken l ine of inheri -
tance. We have already seen that a Community could raise a claim that 
was based on the rights of the ancestors even i f these rights had not been 
exercised for a long period of time.80 A s a result, historical tradit ions 
became one of the most important means of just i fy ing claims to a 
territory. T h e trouble w a s that i f one side presented a historical argu-
ment , the other side might retort by presenting another historical 
argument that contradicted their opponents' argument. Historical argu-
ments figured prominent ly in the conflict between A thens and Phi l ip I I 
of Makedonia over Amphipol is . Both parties had legal arguments on 
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their side. T h e Athen ians could provide documents (various peace-trea-
ties and letters of Phil ip); Phi l ip , on the other hand, appealed to the 
generally accepted right of conquest. A n d yet, although both parties in 
the conflict had legal arguments, they buttressed their Claims wi th 
historical arguments. In this context Aeschines uses the word fp\unxz 
(2.31); it was appropriate to remind Phi l ip of the my th that A k a m a s , 
Theseus' son, had acquired this territory in legendary t imes as the 
dowry of h is wife. Not to be outdone, Phi l ip hired the historian Ant ipater 
of Magnesia, who provided the necessary mythological and historical 
arguments: Amphipol i s belonged originally to the Herakleidai , Philip's 
ancestors. Af ter the Persian Wars K ing Alexandras I had ruled over this 
land, as a golden statue in Delphoi demons t ra ted -aga in an archaeologi-
cal argument.81 The object of the dispute was shifted by both parties to 
the first occupation of the land (ex arches ktesis - see above p. 192).82 
In such cases the legal issue might become the object of historical 
research. Historiographical works were used, old poems recited, oracles 
and documents quoted and forged.83 W h e n rendering their decision, the 
judges often had to choose which historical tradit ion they regarded as 
the most trustworthy. A better known and more characteristic case is 
provided by the latest stage in the conflict between Priene and Samos 
over territories on the coast of As ia Minor, the fortress Kar ion and 
neighbouring Dryoussa (c. 197-190 BCE).84 T h e Samians (who lost the 
case in this bout) cited the work of Maiandrios, a Mi les ian historian of 
the fourth Century, who stated the disputed territory belonged to Samos 
since the end of the 'Meliac War ' in the eighth Century. They also cited 
the works of the Samian historians Euagon, Oul iades, Olympichos, and 
Douris. O n their side the Pr ienians had the test imony of the historians 
Theopompos of Chios, Kreophylos, and Eualkes of Samos. These histori-
cal works supplemented m a n y documents brought forward by the 
parties. W h a t is even more interesting is the w a y the Rhodian judges, 
who had to decide this case, treated the evidence. They compared the 
cufferent versions of the story of the Meliac War and found out that only 
the 'Histories' attributed to Maiandrios of Miletos reported that the 
Samians were allotted the disputed areas of Kar ion and Dryoussa after 
the war. O n the other hand, most of the other historians disagreed wi th 
this version and argued that this work was not a genuine work of 
Maiandrios. Not only did the Rhodian judges work l ike modern histori-
ans, critically examining the historiographical mater ia l presented to 
them, but they also founded their verdict on a historical tradition. 
The case of Amphipol i s reveals the problems involved in such histori-
cal arguments. W h e n Phi l ip dated the init ial occupation of this area 
under the rule of k ing Alexandras I, the A then ians responded wi th an 
even earlier claim. Phi l ip then pointed to an even earlier legend. Given 
the Greeks' inventiveness wi th regard to myths , this competition could 
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have easily been continued ad infmitum.8 5 It is not easy to choose among 
historical accounts, and the oldest claims are not necessarily the most 
reliable. Th i s was obvious to the contemporary Greeks. I t is interesting, 
e.g., to observe how Aeschines in his s u m m a r y of the speech that he gave 
to Phi l ip skips the historical arguments to come to the recent, legal 
foundations of the A then ian claims (2.31). Th i s combination of historical 
and legal arguments underl ines even more the prominent position of the 
historical tradit ions in the justif ication of territorial claims. Even when 
a city had a legal argument, it was nevertheless expected to add argu-
ments from history. 
T h e tantal is ing questions are of course, w h y such historical argu-
ments were indispensable and how effective they might really have 
been. These two questions cannot be discussed independently. A first 
important factor should be seen in the nature of Greek international 
arbitration; the decisions were not taken by 'professional' jurists, but by 
elected judges who represented their c i t / s assembly. T h e advocates had 
to deal w i th a very heterogeneous group of people. Different arguments 
would appeal to different individuals; in a procedure in which orality 
played a major part, arguments closely connected wi th religion and 
moral i ty had good chances to prevail. Another, perhaps more important, 
reason for the use of historical arguments, should be seen in the fact that 
for the Greeks, in general - in constitutional history and in the legal 
relations between states — the present acquired to a large extent its 
legit imacy from the past. We can best see the power of historical 
arguments in the cases in which they were legally irrelevant. In the case 
of the conflict between Hierapytna and Itanos, the Magnes ian judges in 
140 and 112 BCE had to answer a very clear question: who possessed the 
disputed territory immediate ly before the beginning of a war in 140? 
T h i s did not prevent the representatives of both adversaries from 
referring to ancestral c la ims (see p. 193). D id this influence the judges? 
Natural ly, it is impossible to teil, but I do not th ink it is a coincidence 
that the judges in both verdicts do not s imply state that the I tan ians 
owned the land when the war started, but go on to underl ine the fact 
that this land was their ancestral territory ([progoinikas)116 and that 
they were its original owners (apo arches).*7 
It is this effectiveness of historical arguments that makes them 
appear almost as a r i tual play, an indispensable part of diplomatic 
contacts. Aesop's fable about the wolf and the lamb can be seen as a 
comment of a keen-sighted observer of the use of historical arguments 
in territorial conflicts: 
Once a wolf saw a l amb that had strayed from the flock, but instead 
of rushing upon h i m to seize h i m by force, he tried to f ind a 
plausible complaint by which to just i fy his hostility. 'Last year, 
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small though you were, you slandered me.' 'How could I last year? 
It's not a year since I was born.' 'Well, then, aren't you cropping this 
field, which is mine?' 'No, for Fve not yet eaten any grass nor have 
I begun to graze.' 'And haven't you drunk from the fountain that is 
mine to drink from?' 'No, even yet m y mother's breast provides m y 
nourishment. ' Thereupon the wolf seized the lamb and while eat-
ing h i m remarked: 'You're not going to rob the wolf of h is dinner 
even though you f ind it easy to refute all m y charges.' 
3.3. Sale 
T h e acquisition of land by a Community through purchase is not attested 
very often, but it is a recognised principle of interstate relations. The 
earl iest instance attested in l i terary sources is the effort of the 
Phoka ians to buy the is land Oinousai from the Chians (Hdt. 1.165.1); 
the Eleians bought the territory of Epeion for 30 talents in the fifth 
Century BCE (Xen. Hell. 3.2.30f.). In the Hellenistic period, Atta los I 
purchased Aig ina from the Aito l ians in 210,88 Rhodos bought Kaunos 
from the Ptolemies for 200 talents around 197,89 and Pi tane claimed that 
it had purchased a disputed territory from K i n g Antiochos I (see p. 196). 
T h e purchase of land alone is, of course, not a sufficient basis for 
claiming ownership: the seller must be the lawful owner of the sold 
object.90 W e have already seen that this was the question which the 
Pergamene judges had to decide in the case of the land which Pi tane had 
bought from Antiochos (see p. 196). Was Antiochos the lawful owner of 
the land h is father had won by the spear or not? A nice example is 
provided by the inscription which concern the restitution to the sanctu-
ary of Apol lon at Delphoi of plots of sacred land which were unlawful ly 
occupied (katechein) by some individuals.91 T h e last section of this 
document lists these un lawfu l occupants who had to return the land and 
demolish any buildings that might have been built on it (C 28-D 4). One 
of these occupants was Hagion who claimed (possibly truly) that he had 
bought this particular plot (D 3f.: egorakenai). Since he had to give the 
land back, he must have purchased it from an earlier unlawful occupant. 
T h e conditions of sale could also be legally relevant. In 400 BCE the 
Spartans took from the Eleians the territory of the Epeians, which they 
had bought from 'those who possessed (echonton) the city then'. Obvi -
ously, the Eleians appealed to a transaction which the Spartans claimed 
was illegal. They argued that a purchase that had taken place under 
pressure (bia priamenous) was not in any way more just than violent 
deprivation (bia aphelomenous).92 Xenophon's report is very brief, but it 
seems plausible that the Spartans did not reject the right of conquest in 
general, but only the violent seizure of property under certain conditions 
such as in an unjust war. The phrase 'those who possessed the city then' 
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is rather suspicious. I n view of the parallels mentioned above, one is 
tempted to tn ink that the Eleians bought Epeion not from its lawful 
owners, but from some temporary intruders. Unfortunately we have no 
further information on this matter. 
3.4. Donation 
Cases of donation of a territory are hard to f ind earlier than the 
Hellenistic period. T h e case of Epidamnos which was handed over 
(paredosari) by its inhabitants to Korinthos just before the beginning of 
the Peloponnesian War, is a particular case, involving the relations 
between colony and mother city.93 Other references to donation (dosis) 
are connected to legends, such as the gift of Amphipo l i s to A k a m a s as a 
dowry (Aeschin. 2.31) or the donation of Lakeda imon and Messene to 
the Spartans (Isocrates Archid. 18 and 24). Another particular case of 
(not entirely voluntary) donation has already been discussed above (p. 
190). Ars inoe gave (SI&öUX) a disputed territory (in fact he ld by Nagidos) 
to Nagidos, following a request by the strategos of Ki l ik ia ; the grant of 
the land meant a fül l and permanent transfer of lawful ownership; the 
conditions were regulated not by a treaty, but by a decree of Ars inoe (late 
th ird Century BCE).94 T h e gift of territory is regarded as one of the 
possible (but in this part icular case explicitly forbidden) means of 
acquisition in a peace treaty between Magnesia on the Maiander and 
Miletos (c. 185-180 BCE).95 One-sided grants of territory are of course 
very common in the period of the R o m a n expansion, such as the famous 
(and controversial) donation of Lyk ia to Rhodos 'as a gift' (en dorea).96 
I n the documentary evidence the verb SiSooui is used to designate the 
transfer of property as a gift or testamentary donation.97 However, it 
often designates a conditional transfer of possession, and not the uncon-
ditional change of ownership.98 T h e most important piece of evidence is 
a treaty between the Kre tan city of Praisos and the dependent Commu-
n i ty of Stalai.99 T h e terms of the transaction are as follows: T h e 
Prais ians gave to the Stal i tai the territory and the city and the islands, 
which they possess (gxown) now,100 and one hal f of the harbour revenues 
and of the t i the imposed on the f ishing of purple and of fish, exactly as 
before. They have given all these for all t ime, securely and sovereignly, 
to them and to their descendants.'101 According to the more probable 
interpretation of this ambiguous passage, the Prais ians had conquered 
Stalai and became the owners of the land, the city, and the islands. 
Initially, the Prais ians kept the city and the land, conceding to the 
Stal itai only the islands. Wi th this treaty the Prais ians, as the lawful 
proprietors, give to the Stalitai the territory and the city. T h e new 
arrangement allowed the Stal i tai unl imited possession, but did not 
transfer ownership. T h e transfer was a conditional donation (cf. epi 
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toisde edokan), which could be annul led if the Stal itai did not abide by 
the conditions of the donation (i.e., the payment of tribute and the 
offering of other Services). The payment of tribute, in particular, shows 
that the Prais ians remained the owners of the land they donated.102 
6. The 'common custom of the Greeks': beyond 
l i terary fiction and closer to international law 
With the exception of the theoretical statement of the Magnesian judges 
(see p. 186) the documentary sources give us no direct and explicit 
information about generally recognised principles, and we do not f ind 
references to legal precedents.103 Th i s does not mean that such princi-
ples did not exist. T h e declaration made by judges that they have given 
or would give a verdict in a just or the most just way presupposes some 
basic conceptions of law and justice.104 Tha t these conceptions are not 
defined and were not written down does not necessarily mean that they 
were vague. O n the contrary, it could easily mean that they were 
generally known and accepted. 
A s this study has shown, both the l iterary and the epigraphic evi-
dence from the fifth to the second Century reveal a high degree of 
uni formity both wi th regard to the vocabulary of proprietary rights, 
ownership, possession, and occupation and wi th regard to the argu-
ments presented by the adversaries in order to just i fy their territorial 
claims. T h e use of terms in the l iterary sources corresponds closely to 
the usage in the inscriptions. Despite the existence of a very rieh 
vocabulary that expresses various degrees of possession (p. 188), we 
have observed its careful, subtle, and differentiated use not only wi th in 
the same document, but also in m a n y documents from different areas 
and periods of t ime. Finally, we have seen that the four means of 
acquisition of property mentioned by the Magnesian judges were often 
applied in territorial disputes. Their val idity was not unl imited; the 
exaet circumstances were often legally relevant. These general rules 
and their l imitat ions are attested in texts from different periods and 
areas, both in l iterary sources and in inscriptions. For this reason it 
seems plausible to assume that despite the absence of any theoretical 
treatise or written principles, the Greeks had from the Classical period 
(at the latest) onwards a clear coneeption of th is aspect of their inter-
state relations and a fixed set of principles applicable in interstate 
disputes about land. These principles can and should be regarded as 
' international law'because of the remarkably h igh degree of consistency 
in their application and in the use of the relevant terminology - a 
consistency that is even more remarkable considering the absence of a 
written body of rules. We know about conflicts that lasted for decades or 
even centuries, because one of the parties in the conflict refused to 
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accept the verdict rendered by the arbitrators or judges. In such cases, 
however, the parties did not challenge the val idity of these customary 
principles, but the w a y they were applied in a particular case, the 
historicity of the claims, the veracity of their adversaries' statements, or 
the authenticity of documents.105 O n the other hand, I do not know of a 
Single case where the customary principles were not applied (explicitly 
or implicit ly) or had been rejected and criticised. 
The question when and how these principles came into being is not 
easy to answer. Most of them are closely related to and probably 
originate in civic property law (especially the right of inheritance, which 
is attested earüer than donation and purchase). In several cases one can 
observe a s imilarity between the arguments used in the courts of 
indiv idual poleis and those found in interstate disputes.106 Another 
influence seems to come from the practice of wärfare, for which the 
Greeks h a d generally recognised rules107 and which is natural ly con-
nected w i t h territorial disputes. Two (not necessarily trustworthy) 
references to early interstate agreements mention precise rules about 
permissible conduct in war: the use of weapons striking from afar in the 
Lelant ine War (first ha l f of the seventh Century?)108 and the prohibition 
of cutting a city of the Delphic Amphic tyony off from water supplies in 
the Amphictyonic Oa th (allegedly early sixth Century).109 A common 
element in both tradit ions is the role of a sanctuary (that of Ar temis in 
A m a r y n t h o s and the Delphic sanctuary) and the participation of more 
than two communit ies in the agreement. Even if the historicity of these 
tradit ions is questionable, it is conceivable that local amphictyonies 
m a y have contributed to the development of generally accepted princi-
ples of the proper conduct in war (e.g. the respect toward the sacred 
truce of Panhel lenic competitions). It may not be merely coincidental 
that the references to 'common laws of the Greeks' concern the right of 
conquest, sacred truces, and the treatment of prisoners.110 Besides the 
part played by sanctuaries as meeting places in Archaic Greece and as 
places where documents concerning interstate relations (treaties, arbi-
trations, mark ing out boundaries) were made public, another important 
factor for the wide diffusion of certain rules and legal conceptions was 
the greater frequency of diplomatic contacts from the late sixth Century 
onwards, and the result ing increase in bilateral and mult i lateral trea-
ties, the use of already existing models for drawing up legal documents 
and the exchange of writ ten documents.111 
Of course, in international arbitration the judges did not take deci-
sions 'according to the laws' (kata tous nomous) but 'in accordance wi th 
what is just ' (see n. 104). Bu t neither this nor the absence of a writ ten 
and ratif ied set of Statutes are reasons to deny the existence of interna-
t ional law in ancient Greece. It is more important to observe that an 
undisputed set of principles was consistently applied in international 
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arbitration. T h e conclusions of th is study therefore converge wi th those 
about unwri t ten laws and the laws of the polis reached independently 
by Edward Harris in his chapter on Sophocles' Antigone. Apar t from 
international bodies l ike the Delphic Amphictyony, the Greeks did not 
have an authority that oversaw the uniform application of these rules. 
Yet the gods, so solemnly invoked in the oaths of the parties to the 
dispute and the judges, did represent the u l t imate authority that would 
pun ish lawless and unjust behaviour.112 T h e intellectuals certainly 
made their jokes about the belief that the gods punish wrongdoers 113 or 
associated the creation of the fa i th in gods wi th the hope of a more 
effective implementat ion of justice. 114 Yet this att itude never uprooted 
the idea that the gods did not neglect crime and injustice. If an evil m a n 
m a n a g e d t o e s c a p e p u n i s h m e n t dur ing h i s l i f e t i m e , t h e b e l i e f tha t 
divine punishment awaited him after death or would strike his descen-
dants afforded some consolation to the jus t even if it did not deter 
wrongdoers.115 A s late as the early third Century BCE the polis of Dodona 
asked the local oracle whether the god had sent bad weather as a result 
of some man's impur i ty (SEG 19.427). A n d two hundred years before 
m a n y Athen ians thought their defeat in the Peloponnesian War was a 
divine punishment (Xen. Hell. 2.2.10). T h e fear of the gods was not 
necessarily or a lways less effective than the fear of Uni ted Nations 
sanctions in modern international law. 
Notes 
1. I would like to express my warm thanks to Edward Harris and Lene 
Rubinstein for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
chapter. Their invitation to contribute to this volume has given me the opportu-
nity to reshape a paper written in 1983. I have very much profited from Fritz 
Gschnitzer's criticism of the original version. I should also like to thank Dr 
James Cowey and Edward Harris for correcting my English. 
2.1.Cret. III iv 9. For a recent edition of the entire document and bibliography 
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